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Essays
Who Tolls the Bells for Firms? Tales from
Transition Economies
KATHARINA PISTOR*
Bankruptcy law is regarded as an important mecha-
nism for protecting creditor rights. Much of the cur-
rent debate about bankruptcy law focuses exclusively
on private creditors, ignoring the role of tax authori-
ties as creditor in insolvent firms. Based on data from
several transition economies, this essay documents the
important, if not dominant, role tax authorities play as
initiator of bankruptcy in these countries. While im-
proved tax enforcement is crucial for tackling the
problem of tax arrears and hardening the "soft
budget-constraint" in former socialist countries, this
essay suggests that the presence of the tax authorities
as creditor may also affect the cost of debt financing
and may have contributed to the difficulties firms in
these countries continue to have in obtaining longer
term debt finance. This is the case in particular when
the tax authorities shift from a low to a high enforce-
ment regime in an environment where firms had al-
ready accumulated substantial tax arrears in the past,
making the tax authorities senior creditors in bank-
ruptcy. This essay follows Desai et al. in asking for
more attention to be paid to the tax authorities as
stakeholders in firms. Contrary to Desai et al., how-
ever, the paper suggests that the role of the tax au-
thorities cannot be limited to that of a minority share-
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holder, but is more adequately described as "con-
vertible-equity" holder.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A central question in the theory of the firm is why firms exist
at all.' The question of why firms "die" has been much less conten-
tious. The expectation is that once a firm's liquidation value exceeds
its value as a going concern, it will exit the market and its assets will
be redeployed to more efficient use. Firms do not necessarily exit
voluntarily, mostly because their owners or managers have a vested
interest in keeping them afloat, if only to protect their jobs. How-
ever, creditors may push firms into bankruptcy. They can initiate
bankruptcy directly, or they can pursue a firm hard enough so that it
seeks bankruptcy protection "voluntarily."
This scenario rests on the assumption that markets work ef-
fectively in sorting performing from nonperforming companies. This
essay challenges the notion that the exit decision is necessarily mar-
ket-driven. It investigates who controls the exit decision for firms in
transition economies, i.e. markets and institutions that have not yet
1. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777-95 (1972); R. H. Coase, The Nature of the
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386-405 (1937); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and
Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. EcoN. 691-
719 (1986).
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completely emerged from the institutional infrastructures of the col-
lapsed socialist regimes. Legal institutions-including formal legal
protections of creditor rights, collateral regimes, and bankruptcy pro-
cedures-were established and designed to further the development
of such markets. Given the legacy of socialism, it is perhaps not sur-
prising that the actual use of these new legal institutions has often
deviated from the purpose for which they had been created. This has
been particularly obvious in the context of credit markets. Credi-
tors-including financial and trade creditors-have been slow to use
bankruptcy as a means for recovering their debt. Instead, as this es-
say documents, the state has played a crucial role in the bankruptcy
process. In its role as tax creditor, the state initiates bankruptcy and
imposes financial discipline on firms; but occasionally it also reestab-
lishes state control over economic assets.
The reemergence of state control over economic assets in
former socialist regimes is a somewhat ironic outcome. The major
goal of privatization and the broader economic and legal reforms in
these countries was to "get the state out," and to "depoliticize" eco-
nomic decision-making.2 The chosen means to achieve this was the
privatization of state-owned enterprises, thereby transferring key de-
cision-making powers to private agents. It has been widely assumed
that once ownership rights have been reallocated, economic decision-
making can be safely de-politicized. If markets still fail to develop,
the causes must lie in weak laws or weak legal institutions. 3 Not sur-
prisingly, the second wave of reforms in transition economies and
other emerging markets has focused on strengthening legal institu-
tions to ensure market development.4
Removing state agents from a position in which they can con-
trol a company as owners, however, does not necessarily imply that
state control has subsided, as evidenced by the data presented in this
essay on the state as major creditor in the economy. Moreover, at
least temporarily, privatization left substantial stakes in most firms
2. See MAXIM BOYCKO, ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT VISHNY, PRIVATIZING RUSSIA
11-13 (1995) (arguing that the de-politicization of assets was the single most critical pur-
pose of the mass privatization program the authors designed for Russia).
3. See, e.g., Cheryl W. Gray & Kathryn Hendley, Developing Commercial Law in
Transition Economies: Examples from Hungary and Russia, in THE RULE OF LAW AND
ECONOMIC REFORM IN RUSSIA 139-64 (Jeffrey D. Sachs & Katharina Pistor eds., 1997) (ar-
guing that a major function of legal technical assistance in the former socialist countries was
to install good laws and subsequently to improve the enforcement of such laws).
4. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR
MARKETS 101-15, 151 (2002). This report focusing on institutions for a market economy
follows only six years after the World Development Report that documented the transition
from plan to markets. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996: FROM PLAN
TO MARKET 87-97 (1996) (on the legal infrastructure of transition).
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under state-ownership. Available evidence on how governments and
their agents used these remaining minority stakes suggests that in
most cases the state has been a passive owner. 5 Still, the sheer num-
ber of partially state-owned firms in the early transition period sug-
gested that "getting the state out" was akin to trying to kill the many-
headed Hydra. 6 In most firms today, the Hydra metaphor seems even
more appropriate when examining the role of the state as creditor. In
many transition economies, the state emerged as the largest creditor
in the economy. These days, the chunk of state credits is not chan-
neled through state-owned banks, which have since been privatized,
closed down, or marginalized by the influx of foreign and private
banks.7 Instead, the main source of state financing for firms has
taken the form of tax arrears.8
The state's role in financing the private sector by way of un-
enforced tax claims raises the specter of the "soft budget-
constraint," 9 the defining feature of socialist economic manage-
ment, 10 continuing well beyond the demise of the socialist system.
Examining available evidence in the 1990s, economist Mark Schaffer
concludes that in many transition economies tax arrears were sub-
5. Interviews with state agents in charge of managing these state assets suggest that
they were too under-staffed to attend board meetings regularly and had no clear policy guid-
ance as to how to use state assets. See Katharina Pistor & Joel Turkewitz, Coping with Hy-
dra-State Ownership after Privatization, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE
AND RUSSIA 192,194-209 (Roman Frydman, Cheryl W. Gray & Andrzej Rapaczynski eds.,
1996) (documenting the extent of remaining state ownership in countries that sought to pri-
vatize rapidly and providing evidence on the management of state ownership from inter-
views).
6. See id. at 209.
7. Steven Fries, Damien Neven & Paul Seabright, Bank Performance in Transition
Economies (William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 505, 2002) (documenting the extent
of foreign ownership of domestic banks in many transition economies).
8. Leora F. Klapper, Virginia Sarria-Allende & Victor Sulla, Small- and Medium-Size
Enterprise Financing in Eastern Europe 24 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper
No. 2933, 2002); Mark E. Schaffer, Do Firms in Transition Have Soft Budget Constraints?
A Reconsideration of Concepts and Evidence, 26 J. CoMp. ECON. 80, 84 (1998).
9. Jdinos Kornai, a Hungarian economist who taught for many years at Harvard Uni-
versity, first coined the term "soft budget constraint" as referring to government bailouts of
firms, which he attributed to the desire of paternalistic governments to avoid social and po-
litical costs of firm closure. See, e.g., JANOS KORNAI, THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNISM 489 (1992). Today the term is more widely applied to
refer to dynamic commitment problems in the face of irreversible investments. See Mathias
Dewatripont & Gdrard Roland, Soft Budget Constraints, Transition, and Financial Systems,
156 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 245 (2000); Schaffer, supra note 8.
10. For an analysis of soft budget-constraint in relation to financial market develop-
ment during the transition period, see Erik Bergl6f & Gdrard Roland, Soft Budget Con-
straints and Credit Crunches in Financial Transition, 41 EUR. ECON. REV. 807 (1997). For
an overview of how this concept has been applied in the broader economies literature, see
Eric S. Maskin, The Soft Budget Constraint: Recent Theoretical Work on the Soft Budget
Constraint, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 421 (1999).
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stantial and that they, rather than direct subsidies, were the greatest
source of soft budget-constraint." I  Similarly, economist Ariane
Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. have shown that regions of Russia with
governors who were hostile to economic reforms have often shielded
companies from liquidation by making extensive use of reorganiza-
tion procedures, which prolonged their survival. 12 Even more prob-
lematic is how the state wields its rights as creditor- to pull the trig-
ger and force a firm to exit-which is the most powerful control right
of any stakeholder. 13 Certainly, exercising this power is a prerequi-
site for hardening the soft budget-constraint in transition economies.
Yet, this very power could also be used to reestablish state control
over key aspects of economic decision-making, and indeed over cru-
cial economic assets. The Yukos case in Russia (further discussed
below) suggests that such a scenario is plausible.
This essay presents detailed data from two transition econo-
mies, Hungary and Russia, on the state's role as initiator of firms'
bankruptcy. Available data on the initiator of bankruptcy proceed-
ings over a period of five years show that the state continues to be a
powerful stakeholder in firms in these countries. The study analyzes
how the state has used its powers, in particular whether it acted pri-
marily to help establish financial discipline, enforce its own budget-
ary claims, or use bankruptcy to regain economic control in the af-
termath of privatization. It then suggests that the function of
bankruptcy proceedings differs remarkably across the two countries.
In Hungary, state intervention into the bankruptcy process is primar-
ily a financial-discipline enforcement-device with the state being
slightly more invested in smaller rather than larger companies. In
Russia, by contrast, bankruptcy has become a control device in the
hands of a powerful tax service. In fact, the tax authorities now con-
trol both exit and entry, because they have also been put in charge of
maintaining the official enterprise register. On occasion, bankruptcy
has even been used to re-nationalize assets.
One obvious (and familiar) implication of these findings is
that the functions of legal institutions, such as bankruptcy, differ
widely from country to country and are highly context-specific. 14
11. See Schaffer, supra note 8.
12. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, Konstantin Sonin & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, Cap-
ture of Bankruptcy 5-7 (June 18, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ideas.repec.org/p/cfr/cefirw/w0038.html.
13. Shareholders also exercise liquidation rights, but they need to act collectively since
corporate law provisions typically require a majority or even supermajority for liquidating a
firm by shareholder vote. By contrast, a creditor can enforce liquidation rights unilaterally,
provided that a debtor is "insolvent."
14. This insight was acknowledged by some of the protagonists of the first law and de-
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Therefore, simple quantitative studies that attempt to relate the num-
ber of bankruptcies in a given country to the level of creditor rights
protection (such as a recent study conducted by scholars at the World
Bank) 15 seem somewhat misguided, as they ignore the identity of the
agents who trigger bankruptcy, or the nature of the companies that
are forced into bankruptcy. The same is true for studies that link le-
gal protection to even more remote economic outcomes, such as
credit-market development, which is typically measured by the vol-
ume of claims financial institutions have outstanding against the pri-
vate sector. 16 These studies fail to explain the mechanisms that relate
the law on the books to financial markets as the observed empirical
outcome; neither do they conclusively show that shareholders or
creditors actually exercise the rights given to them by law, nor that
these rights are enforceable within a given legal system.
Yet, the major point this essay seeks to make is a different
one. As has been noted above, the question of who determines the
ultimate fate of a firm is hardly addressed in the literature on the the-
ory of the firm or the theoretical bankruptcy literature. While there is
substantial discussion about allocating the bankruptcy-initiation
power to either the debtor or the creditor, 17 the discussion for the
most part assumes a simple contractual relation between a private
debtor and a private creditor, each maximizing its economic interests.
velopment movement that used legal transplants in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to im-
prove socioeconomic development in developing countries. For a self-critical assessment of
this movement, see David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement:
Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974
Wis. L. REV 1062 (1974). But see Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-
Development Studies, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 470 (1995) (arguing that these conclusions were
drawn before the results of such policy interventions could be fully assessed). See also
Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect, 51 AM.
J. COmP. L. 163 (2003) (explaining the failure of legal transplants as caused by the lack of
demand in the recipient countries).
15. Stijn Claessens & Leora F. Klapper, Bankruptcy around the World: Explanations
of Its Relative Use, 7 AM. L. ECON. REV. 253 (2005).
16. See Ross Levine, The Legal Environment, Banks, and Long-Run Economic
Growth, 30 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 596 (1998). The basic analytical framework for
this research was developed in Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei
Shleifer, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (arguing that legal institutions
greatly influence the development of credit and stock markets). For a more detailed account
of law as a determinant of credit markets, see also Pistor et al., using a similar framework to
investigate the role of law as a determinant of credit market development in transition
economies in the 1990s. Katharina Pistor, Martin Raiser & Stanislaw Gelfer, Law and Fi-
nance in Transition Economies, 8 ECON. TRANSITION 325 (2000). Their results suggest that
specific legal intervention is less relevant for market development than a country's overall
performance on rule-of-law indicators.
17. See Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation Problem in Bankruptcy, 11 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 223 (1991); Elazar Berkovitch & Ronen Israel, Optimal Bankruptcy Laws Across Dif-
ferent Economic Systems, 12 REv. FIN. STUD. 347 (1999); Paul Povel, Optimal "Soft" Or
"Tough " Bankruptcy Procedures, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 659 (1999).
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These discussions have missed the relationship between debtors and
tax authorities, who can be cast as creditors to those debtors that have
large tax arrears.
This essay focuses on tax creditors and their role in determin-
ing the timing and outcome of bankruptcy. It documents the domi-
nant role the state plays in determining the fate of firms in transition
economies, including those that have implemented extensive privati-
zation programs. In these countries it is by way of enforcing past tax
liabilities that the state now determines the future of firms. This es-
say thus joins a growing debate about the role of the tax authorities in
the corporate governance of firms. Desai, Dyck, and Zingales first
emphasized this role in a recent paper,' 8 and they describe the tax au-
thorities as a "minority shareholder." 19 This characterization stems
from the fact that the tax authorities participate in future profits of the
firm. According to Desai et al., levying a profit tax, and making a
credible commitment to enforce such a tax, creates a powerful gov-
ernance device not only for the state, but also indirectly for minority
shareholders. The effect of a corporate tax on minority shareholders,
according to this analysis, depends on the quality of the governance
structure in place. When governance structures are weak, i.e. when
blockholders control the firm unchallenged by minority shareholders,
an increase in the tax rate will increase a blockholder's return from
stealing. The more a blockholder steals, the lower the firm's profits
and thus the lower the effective tax rate the firm will have to pay to
the tax authorities. However, Desai et al. also suggest that strength-
ening tax enforcement can increase the return to minority investors
and thereby enhance overall corporate governance.20 They argue that
effective tax enforcement forces the firm to disclose its assets not
only to the tax authorities, but also to its shareholders. The authors
use Russia as a case study to demonstrate the relation between im-
proved tax enforcement in the Putin era and increases in stock prices
of publicly traded firms.
This essay explores a different aspect of the relationship be-
tween tax authorities and private firms. It suggests that depicting the
tax authorities as an equity holder misses part of the story. Although
the tax authorities do not receive a fixed return on their investment,
as creditors typically do, they have a claim against the future profits
of the firm, as equity holders typically do. However, once a firm de-
faults on its tax obligation, the tax authorities' claims automatically
18. See Mihir A. Desai, Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Theft and Taxes, 84 J. FIN.
ECON. 591 (2007).
19. Id. at 592.
20. Id.
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convert into a debt claim. Most importantly, like creditors, they
wield the power to trigger bankruptcy proceedings against such a
firm. It therefore seems to be more appropriate to characterize the
tax authorities as a holder of "convertible equity."
Still, tax authorities differ from ordinary creditors in impor-
tant ways. Most importantly, their objectives are not only to secure
future repayments of debt owed by a particular firm, but also to en-
force tax compliance more generally. As a result, they may be less
inclined to refinance or defer repayment. Moreover, tax authorities
are designed by law to be more powerful than unsecured creditors;
failure to pay taxes typically allows the tax authorities to unilaterally
create a lien over the tax debtor's assets. Furthermore, most bank-
ruptcy codes allow the tax authority to recover prior to unsecured
creditors.
The role of the tax authorities as a claimant in a firm's bank-
ruptcy has been neglected by much of the theoretical bankruptcy lit-
erature. This essay hopes to stimulate further inquiry by analyzing
the special role of tax authorities as creditors in the context of transi-
tion economies. Like a magnifying glass, these countries reveal ten-
sions in governance structures that tend to go unnoticed in developed
economies.
This essay is organized as follows. Section II discusses the
"initiation problem," that is, the optimal allocation of the power to
trigger bankruptcy proceedings. Section III presents summary data
on bankruptcy initiation in Hungary and Russia, which suggest the
extensive role the state plays as tax creditors in firms. Section IV ex-
amines available data for Hungary and Russia in greater detail to de-
termine the purpose of state-initiated bankruptcies in these two coun-
tries. Section V reflects on the role of bankruptcy taking into account
the tax authorities as a crucial stakeholder of firms in transition
economies. Section VI summarizes the main findings and makes
suggestions for future research.
II. WHO SHOULD TOLL THE BELLS FOR FIRMs
Firms are creatures of human action. They do not emerge;
they are established. Nor do they die a natural death; they are shut
down. This raises the question as to who should decide when to
close a firm. Traditionally this decision lies in the hands of two
groups: creditors and debtor-owners. This section explores the allo-
cation of the power to trigger bankruptcy between these two groups,
and what the optimal allocation of this authority would be in econo-
2008]
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mies at different stages of development.
For solvent firms, the answer is simple: the firm's owner, as
the holder of its residual rights of control, should exercise the power
to shut down the firm. For insolvent firms, the answer is more com-
plicated. Insolvency implies that the combined claims of all creditors
exceed the firm's assets, i.e., after their claims are enforced, there are
no assets left over which the owners could exercise their residual
rights of control. This suggests that creditors should have the power
to initiate a firm's exit. Creditors may, however, suffer from infor-
mation asymmetries and face difficulties verifying when a firm is
temporarily illiquid, as opposed to permanently insolvent. Creditors
also face serious collective action problems. Each creditor is better
off when enforcing her claim individually, while all creditors share a
collective benefit from an orderly procedure, even though through
this procedure some might only be satisfied pro rata or leave empty-
handed.2 1
It has therefore been suggested that a system that favors the
debtor's initiation of bankruptcy is superior to a regime dominated by
creditors. 22 The reason is that the debtor knows best when the line
between temporary illiquidity and insolvency has been crossed.
Since the debtor (or agents acting on its behalf) has strong incentives
to delay or avoid bankruptcy, a regime where debtors are supposed to
initiate bankruptcy requires an appropriate incentive structure for the
debtor to take action. Giving the debtor the option to initiate a reor-
ganization procedure and thereby avoid the immediate liquidation of
the firm appears to be such a device. The major benefit of a "soft"
reorganization regime thus appears to be its ability to resolve the ini-
tiation problem, 23 even though this does not come without costs,
since many firms that enter reorganization should probably be liqui-
dated immediately. 24 By contrast, a pure liquidation regime, i.e. one
that makes reorganization contingent on creditor consent, leaves the
initiation decision ultimately in the hands of creditors.
Recent work has sought to relate the allocation of the bank-
ruptcy initiation power to the structure of an economy, rather than de-
termining the optimal allocation of these powers in the abstract.
Economists Berkovitch and Israel characterize economic systems
based on their information structure.25 They distinguish systems in
21. See Baird, supra note 17, at 226.
22. Id. at 229.
23. See Povel, supra note 17, at 673.
24. Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business
Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 2310, 2340 (2005).
25. See Berkovitch & Israel, supra note 17, at 353.
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which information costs are low and managers and creditors rely on
similar information to determine the future viability of the firm, from
systems where managers enjoy a significant information advantage
over creditors because of the high costs and low quality of informa-
tion. In addition, they analyze the nature of financing relations as ei-
ther arms-length or involving long-term credit relations, i.e. with
banks. Based on these characteristics they conclude that in devel-
oped economies with a bank-based system and well-developed in-
formation-acquisition technologies-resulting in reduced information
asymmetries-creditors should have the final say over the future of
the firm. By contrast, developed economies with arms-length financ-
ing and equally well-developed information-acquisition technologies,
should have both creditor and debtor chapters.26
The major difference between these two types of developed
economies, according to Berkovitch and Israel, is that in bank-
centered systems, information is hard, meaning that the manager can
predict the outcome of creditors' investigation into the viability of the
firm and thus respond strategically by either initiating bankruptcy
himself or continuing the firm.27 In market-based systems, by con-
trast, information is more dispersed and "soft," making it more diffi-
cult for the manager to act strategically. At the same time, the credi-
tor may over-enforce bankruptcy. Debtor-initiated bankruptcy thus
works as an important defense against over-aggressive creditors in a
market-based financial system. Finally, countries with poor informa-
tion-acquisition technologies and concentrated financing should also
have both creditor and debtor chapters. The reasoning here is that in
a low-quality-information environment, managers have a strategic
advantage over creditors because they have better information upon
which to base their assessment of the viability of the firm. Creditors
can access this information only through management, not through
their own independent investigation. A system that exploits manag-
ers' superior information where it exists, i.e. one that includes a
debtor chapter, is thus superior to one that lacks it. However, since
managers may abuse their strategic advantage, Berkovitch and Israel
argue that creditors should also have the option to initiate and control
bankruptcy. 28
It follows, therefore, that transition economies should have
both a debtor and a creditor chapter. Information quality has been
notoriously low in the former socialist countries, characterized by the
absence of market prices, reliable firm-specific information, as well
26. Id.
27. Id. at 364.
28. Id.
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as intermediaries capable of collecting and verifying relevant infor-
mation.29 In such an environment firm insiders are bound to have
superior information. 30 Nevertheless, in most transition economies
bankruptcy-initiation powers are biased heavily in favor of credi-
tors. 3 1 The rationale seems to have been to impose financial disci-
pline on firms after they had operated for too long under a "soft
budget-constraint. ' 32 Based on the analysis provided by Berkovitch
and Israel, however, a more appropriate strategy may have been to
improve debtors' incentives to initiate bankruptcy, rather than to tilt
the balance of power too much in favor of often-uninformed credi-
tors. 33 The same could be said for most other countries' bankruptcy
regimes. While most countries allow both creditors and debtors to
initiate bankruptcy proceedings, most favor creditor-initiated bank-
ruptcy. 34 The bias in favor of creditor-initiated bankruptcies has
been maintained despite the fact that in recent years many countries
have either introduced or strengthened reorganization procedures.
However, in these countries creditors, not debtors, control entry to
reorganization. While in the US a debtor can file for Chapter 11 re-
organization, in most other countries, liquidation is the default proce-
dure and creditor consent is required for switching from liquidation
into reorganization. 35
29. Derek Bailey, Accounting in Transition in the Transitional Economy, 4 EUR. ACCT.
REV. 595, 609 (1995) (suggesting that sound accounting practices were largely absent in the
early days of transition). See also Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Governing Stock Mar-
kets in Transition Economies: Lessons from China, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 184, 195 (2005)
(arguing that in environments where such agents are lacking, the information asymmetries
tend to be even more severe).
30. Roman Frydman, Katharina Pistor & Andrzej Rapaczynski, Investing in Insider-
Dominated Firms: A Study of Russian Voucher Privatization Funds, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND RUSSIA 187, 188-89 (Roman Frydman, Cheryl W.
Gray & Andrzej Rapaczynski eds., 1996) (analyzing the role of financial intermediaries in
the context of mass privatization in Russia and pointing out the severe information asymme-
tries they face).
31. See Katharina Pistor, Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights
in Transition Economies, 1 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REv. 59 (2000) (coding creditor rights protec-
tion in bankruptcy codes and civil codes (for collaterals) in 24 transition economies and find-
ing a strong bias in favor of creditor rights consistent with the legacy of these countries as
mostly German civil law countries).
32. See supra note 9, for the literature on soft budget constraints.
33. See supra note 17.
34. For a comparative overview of creditor versus debtor friendly bankruptcy regimes,
see Stijn Claessens & Leora Klapper, Bankruptcy Around the World: Explanations of its
Relative Use 4-6 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2865, July 2002),
available at
http://econ.worldbank.org/extemal/default/main?pagePK=64165259&theSitePK=469382&p
iPK=64165421 &menuPK=64166093&entitylD=000094946_02080204172482. See also
Simeon Djankov & Andrei Shleifer, Private Credit in 129 Countries, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 299,
307-12 (2007).
35. See Baird, supra note 17, at 227-28 (discussing the ability of a manager to file for
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III. WHO TOLLS THE BELLS FOR FIRMS? RECENT DATA FROM
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
This section presents recent data about which agents have
been the most active bankruptcy initiators in Hungary and Russia.
Table 1 below presents summary evidence. The scope of the study
was limited to these two countries because this kind of data is notori-
ously difficult to collect; only a few countries collect these data at the
national level or make them publicly available. 36 The table presents
the average number of bankruptcies filed in these two countries over
a period of four to five years (depending upon data availability). It
also shows the share of bankruptcy proceedings in court that have
been initiated by debtors or creditors, and differentiates between state
creditors and private creditors.
Table 1: Initiators of Bankruptcy Proceedings in Court in Hungary and Russia (1999-
2003)*
All data = average per year Hungary Russia
Cases initiated 13,598 39,953
By debtor 1512 4306
By creditor 12,713 35,647
State creditors 4911 34,199
Private creditors 7801 1448
Source: Calculations based on data collected from the Hungarian Association of Insolvency
Practitioners & Asset Controllers (available at http://www/foe.hu/hirek/2001/fioktelep.php;
and the Russian Supreme Arbitrazh Court. Summary statistics from the Supreme Arbitrazh
Court are available at http://www.arbitr.ru/news/totals/. Detailed data were provided from
unpublished sources of the court.
* Excluding accelerated procedures against "absentee" debtors.
As these data illustrate, the number of bankruptcy filings var-
ies substantially between the two countries. As an initial matter, dif-
ferences in bankruptcy filings across countries can be difficult to ac-
count for, because the propensity to file depends on economic
conditions and the incentive structure for creditors or debtors to initi-
ate proceedings. Notwithstanding these limitations, one possible
benchmark for comparison are other European countries for which
filing data are available. Interestingly, the bankruptcy rates in Hun-
gary are roughly comparable with those of other Western European
Chapter 11 reorganization). For a broader comparative perspective, see Claessens & Klap-
per, supra note 34, at 7-8.
36. In fact, neither Hungarian nor Russian officially published sources break down the
data in the way I present them here. However, I was able to obtain these data directly from
the Russian Supreme Arbitrazh Court and Hungarian Ministry of Justice.
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economies. A recent study of insolvencies in Europe found that
Germany had about 135 insolvencies per 10,000 companies (equaling
1 percent), France 160 (1.5 percent), and Italy 39 (.03 percent).3
The equivalent number for Hungary was 90 (.09 percent).' 8 Similar
data for Russia were not available. According to data compiled by
the Federal Tax Services, in 2003 there were over 2 million compa-
nies (of which 170,000 are joint stock companies) registered in Rus-
sia. According to their data, over 30,000 companies (or 1.5 percent)
were in the state of liquidation in 2003. 39 It should, however, be
noted that in 2003 overall bankruptcy filings had declined substan-
tially.40
More interesting for the purpose of this essay, however, is the
identity of the bankruptcy initiator. It is particularly striking that
creditor filings make up such a substantial number of bankruptcies
proceedings, as well as what appears to be a high share of bankruptcy
filings by the state.
The strong bias in favor of creditor-initiated bankruptcy-
proceedings appears to be a feature of the formal law. In Hungary,
while debtors may initiate a reorganization procedure, they have to
obtain creditor consent for a moratorium within 30 days of filing.
Furthermore, at least half of all creditors must be present to take
binding decisions. 4 1 If the debtor fails to obtain creditor consent for
a moratorium, the court terminates reorganization, opening the way
for creditors to bring a liquidation action.42 Moreover, even if credi-
tor consent has been obtained, management autonomy is significantly
curtailed in bankruptcy, as the court will appoint a bankruptcy trustee
who has the power to approve any financial commitment of the com-
pany beyond an amount fixed by the creditors.43 In Russia, the law
facilitates creditor filing even more. The decision of whether a firm
will go into reorganization, be subjected to administrative manage-
ment by a court-appointed receiver, or enter liquidation proceedings,
is made only after bankruptcy has been initiated.44 The debtor there-
37. CREDITREFORM ECON. RESEARCH UNIT, INSOLVENCY IN EUROPE (2004/05) 4, Table
2.
38. Id. at 19, Table 15 (surveying bankruptcy in selected Western European countries).
39. For 2003 data, see the Russian Tax Service, http://www.nalog.ru/document.php?id
=8586&topic=regurlic. The data list companies that are in the state of liquidation as well
as those slated for reorganization.
40. Id.
41. Act XLIX of 1991 on Bankruptcy Proceedings § 9 (Hung.) (ISI Emerging Markets,
Hatflyos Magyar Jogszabdlyok database), available at www.securities.com [hereinafter
Hungarian Bankruptcy Code].
42. Id. § 10(3)(e).
43. Id. § 14.
44. Federal Law on Insolvency, Oct. 26, 2002, No.127-FZ, art. 59 (Russ.) (ISI Emerg-
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fore cannot stack the cards in his favor by bringing a reorganization
proceeding. As a result, debtors have few incentives to initiate bank-
ruptcy in the first place. Creditor dominance of the bankruptcy-
initiation decision is not limited to transition economies, but it is the
norm even in Western market economies. The lone exception is the
United States, where "voluntary" or debtor filings make up more than
90 percent of all bankruptcy filings.4
5
What is more remarkable is the share of bankruptcy proceed-
ings that the state has initiated. Between 1999 and 2003, state agents
initiated on average 85.6 percent of all bankruptcy cases in Russia.
The majority of these cases were initiated by the tax authorities (see
Table 4, infra). Even in Hungary, state-initiated bankruptcies ac-
counted for, on average, 36 percent of filings between 1999 and
2003. In both countries the tax authorities are the most important
state agents involved in bankruptcy. The legacy of tax arrears in
transition economies explains the strong presence of tax authorities.
During the first part of the 1990s, tax authorities lacked the capacity
to effectively enforce taxes. Moreover, taxes were levied not only on
profits, but on excess wages, effectively imposing an income tax on
firms. 4 6 The effect of this legacy is that the state has become one of
the largest, if not the largest, creditors in the economy with the dis-
cretion to exercise the full range of powers that come with this posi-
tion.
The strong presence of tax authorities as creditors may be mo-
tivated by several state objectives: pedagogical, creditor, or preda-
tory. First, the state may have stepped into the void and triggered
bankruptcy in an attempt to familiarize private agents with the proce-
dure, hoping that this would eventually give rise to a purely market-
driven process (a pedagogical function). Second, the state may be
enforcing its own claims to increase budget revenue and improve fi-
nancial discipline in the long term (a creditor function). Third, the
state may be using bankruptcy as a means to regain control over deci-
sion-making, and possibly over key assets in the economy (a preda-
tory function).
ing Markets, Garant database), available at www.securities.com [hereinafter 2002 Federal
Law on Insolvency].
45. See U.S. COuRTS: 2006 JUDICIAL FACTS & FIGURES, Table 7.2, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2006/Table702.pdf (last visited, April 9, 2008)
(stating that of 1,618,987 bankruptcies filed in 2004, including business and non-business
bankruptcies, only 602 were involuntary filings). See also Edward Morrison, Bankruptcy
Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies,
Working Paper No. 239, 2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=880 101 (noting that the
majority of these involuntary filings quickly end up in Chapter 7, i.e. in liquidation).
46. Orge Martinez-Vazquez & Robert M. McNab, The Tax Reform Experiment in
Transitional Countries, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 273, 278 (2000).
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There is some evidence in support of each of these proposi-
tions. With respect to the state's pedagogical function, it is worth
noting that the introduction of bankruptcy codes in transition econo-
mies did not trigger a wave of bankruptcy filings, as would have been
expected by those believing in the power of the market to produce ef-
ficient outcomes once institutional obstacles have been overcome.
During that time, many firms experienced serious liquidity problems
and a substantial share of them were technically insolvent. Hungary
tried to resolve this problem by introducing a so-called automatic
trigger in 1992. 47 The law, entered into force in January 1992, re-
quired each debtor unable to pay its obligations for 90 days to file for
reorganization. The total number of debtor-initiated reorganizations
almost quadrupled from 724 cases filed in the first quarter of that
year, to 2259 cases filed in the second quarter. The number of bank-
ruptcy filings decreased only after the automatic trigger was removed
in 1993. Since then, reorganization cases have accounted only a tiny
fraction of all insolvency cases filed in Hungarian courts.48
With hindsight, the introduction of an automatic trigger ap-
pears to have been a flawed attempt to impose market-discipline on
firms. Comparative studies quickly revealed that in developed-
market economies, deferring payment for 90 days or more is com-
mon practice and does not give rise to immediate enforcement action
by creditors. 49 In the context of transition economies, such drastic
action seemed particularly inappropriate, as most firms were experi-
encing serious financial stress resulting from the economic reforms
of the time.50 Distinguishing potentially viable firms from nonviable
firms in such an environment was almost impossible, and it was
unlikely that the legislature had superior information over either
debtors or creditors to make such a determination. 51 The immediate
effect of the automatic trigger was to dramatically increase the work-
load of courts as well as court-appointed bailiffs, not the desired fil-
tering of nonviable from viable firms.
Still, the automatic trigger introduced in Hungary to stimulate
bankruptcy was a relatively benign measure compared to those taken
47. John P. Bonin & Mark E. Schaffer, Revisiting Hungary's Bankruptcy Episode, in
DESIGNING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES: STRATEGIES FOR REFORM IN
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 59, 69 (Anna Meyendorff & Anjan Thakor eds., 2002).
48. See infra pp. 16-18, for detailed analysis of Hungarian data.
49. See, e.g., Schaffer, supra note 8, at 88-92.
50. For a sobering account on the financial distress experienced by firms during transi-
tion, see OLIVIER BLANCHARD, THE ECONOMICS OF POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITION 1-21
(1997). See also Nadezhda Ivanova & Charles Wyplosz, Arrears: The Tide That is Drown-
ing Russia, 8 RuSS. ECON. TRENDS 24 (1999).
51. Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart & John Moore, The Economics of Bankruptcy Re-
form, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 523, 543 (1992).
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elsewhere. Although it forced debtors into bankruptcy under condi-
tions determined by law (failure to pay debt for more than 90 days), it
did not allocate discretionary power to a state agent charged with
bankruptcy initiation powers, as was the case in Russia. Russia in-
troduced its first bankruptcy code in 1992 to little effect; it resulted in
only 74 bankruptcy cases brought in 1993, 231 in 1994, and 716 in
1995. Instead, firms were piling up inter-enterprise arrears as well as
tax arrears, which together reached 40 percent of GDP by 1998.52
This outcome may have been in response to the uncertainty over the
future of economic reforms in Russia. In an attempt to make the re-
forms more credible and to force apparently nonviable firms to exit
the market, President Yeltsin established a Federal Bankruptcy
Agency by decree. 53 The purpose of this agency was to identify
large companies that had become insolvent, place them under admin-
istrative management, and either salvage them or close them down
eventually. 54 Between 1998 and 2002, the agency initiated 3890
cases per year on average, or about 10 percent of all cases filed dur-
ing this period. In 2002, its successor agency was authorized as the
sole state agent allowed to file bankruptcy against delinquent firms.
That agency, however, was formally dissolved in June 2004; its func-
tions were then merged with the reorganized Federal Tax Services
("FTS").
Consistent with the "creditor function" of tax-authority-
induced bankruptcy, there is substantial evidence that states enforced
bankruptcy to increase revenue and enhance financial discipline, as
well as bolster voluntary compliance with tax claims. A comparative
analysis of tax arrears in transition economies documented that the
stock of tax arrears in Hungary amounted to 6.9 percent of GDP in
1994, whereas in Russia, it had reached 12 percent of GDP in 199651
and close to 17 percent in 1998.56 Schaffer argues that the stock of
tax arrears does not necessarily give rise to concern, as long as taxes
are paid eventually. 57 Of greater concern is the flow of tax liabilities
that is not getting paid at all or is being written off, as that flow indi-
cates the continuing indirect subsidization of firms, i.e. a soft budget-
constraint. 58 The best indicator for such a flow problem is an in-
52. See Ivanova & Wyplosz, supra note 50, at 24.
53. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on Measures to Enforce Legisla-
tive Acts on Insolvency (Bankruptcy) of Enterprises, Dec. 22, 1993, No. 2264 (Russ.) (ISI
Emerging Markets, Garant Database), available at www.securities.com.
54. Id. art. 2.
55. See Schaffer, supra note 8, at 98.
56. See Ivanova & Wyplosz, supra note 50, at 26.
57. See Schaffer, supra note 8, at 97.
58. Id.
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crease in the stock of tax arrears over time, as new tax arrears are
added to old ones that have remained uncollected. Estimating the
flow of tax arrears in transition economies based on effective statu-
tory rates, actual tax-collection information, as well as enterprise-
performance information, he finds a total of annualized flow for
Hungary in the amount of 1.2 percent of GDP in 1993, and 0.7 in
1994. 59 For Russia, on the other hand, the flow stood at 2.1 percent
in 1994 and reached 7.3 percent in 1996.60
To put these numbers into perspective, it is worth considering
the size of the credit market in Hungary and Russia. As noted above,
tax arrears were often used as substitutes for private debt finance by
companies who either did not have access to the credit market, or did
not want to subject themselves to the possibly more stringent en-
forcement practices of private creditors. These companies relied in-
stead on state-supplied soft budget-constraints. The size of private
credit-markets is commonly measured by the total claims that de-
posit-taking institutions hold against the private sector, divided by
GDP.6 1 Recent data suggest that the current Hungarian credit market
is 34 percent of GDP while the Russian credit market is 16 percent.62
Taking current figures as a benchmark, the total stock of tax arrears
in Russia in 1998 (17 percent of GDP) was slightly larger than the
private credit market, with nearly half of the arrears being accumu-
lated rather than new. The data are less dramatic in Hungary (see
Table 2 below), but nonetheless suggest that the state continues to
hold important control rights over the economy.63
Finally, there is evidence in Russia that bankruptcy has come
to be used increasingly as an instrument of state control over the
economy and, on occasion, as a means for reestablishing state owner-
ship over key economic assets. The Yukos case is the most glaring
example: the state seized Yuganskneftegaz (the subsidiary of Yukos)
in December 2004, transferred its assets to the state-controlled Ros-
neft Company in February 2005, and finally liquidated Yukos in
2006.64 In addition, bankruptcy proceedings have been used by the
59. Id. at 98.
60. Id.
61. Levine, supra note 16, at 603.
62. Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh & Andrei Shleifer, Private Credit in 129 Coun-
tries, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 299, 303, Table 1 (2007).
63. The flow problem was mitigated over time at least in part by reducing taxes. In
particular, Russia drastically reduced its corporate tax in 2001 and introduced a flat tax of
only 24 percent. However, this did not eliminate the stock problem, which was consider-
able. Neither did it prevent the tax authorities from claiming that tax sheltering strategies
amounted to tax evasion as evidenced by enforcement actions taken. On the Yukos case in
particular, see infra note 64.
64. For a full account of the use of bankruptcy law to re-nationalize Yukos, see CURTIS
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tax authorities not only to enforce tax claims, but also to enforce the
mandatory enterprise-registration requirement. A new law passed in
2002, "Concerning State Registration of Companies," designated the
FTS as the registering organ for all companies. Failure to comply
with registration requirements may result in a state agent bringing
liquidation actions, according to the Russian Civil Code.65 In effect,
the tax authorities have been empowered to close down firms that
opted for the gray economy by failing to register with the state and/or
to pay taxes.
In sum, there is evidence that state-initiated bankruptcy did
serve various purposes. As to which was the dominant purpose in
both countries, the following section will explore the political econ-
omy of state-initiated bankruptcies in Hungary and Russia in greater
detail.
IV. BELL TOLLING STRATEGIES: HUNGARY AND RUSSIA
COMPARED
Section III elaborated the various purposes that state-initiated
bankruptcy proceedings could serve. Section IV offers a detailed ex-
ploration of the respective situations of Hungary and Russia, to de-
termine the objective function of the tax authorities in their enforce-
ment practice. There is relatively little evidence for the "pedagogical
function" of bankruptcy in either country. In fact, the majority of
bankruptcies initiated by tax authorities appear to target firms that
have few assets to recover and may have already seized operations.
For the remaining cases, the Hungarian tax authorities perform pri-
marily the "creditor function": they seek to impose financial disci-
pline and satisfy claims by liquidating firms. The main difference
between the two countries is that in Russia, but not in Hungary, there
is substantial evidence also of predatory enforcement by the tax au-
thorities, which is highly selective and frequently motivated by po-
litical rather than economic reasons.
A special feature of the state acting as creditor and enforcing
its tax liabilities is that the state has more extensive enforcement
powers than private creditors. In theory, therefore, the tax authorities
J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES
REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD (2008)
149-72.
65. Article 61 of the Russian Civil Code states the grounds on which liquidation peti-
tions may be brought. They include irremediable violations of the law, continuous viola-
tions, and failure to comply with registration requirements, among others. Grazhdanskii
Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 61 (Russ.).
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could overcome the information disadvantage creditors tend to have
vis-d-vis managers in an environment where information is costly
and of low quality. 66 Vesting the tax authorities with such powers,
however, also raises the prospect of excessive tax enforcement at the
expense not only of the debtor, but also of private creditors.
The extent of the tax authorities' enforcement-powers differs
across countries. They are expansive and relatively unchecked in
Russia, but have been more limited in Hungary, 67 at least after the in-
tervention of the Hungarian Constitutional Court. In 1998 Hungary
enacted a law establishing a "Tax and Financial Control Administra-
tion" (the Hungarian acronym is "APEH") with a criminal investiga-
tion department. 68 The latter was given the power to "conduct clan-
destine collection of information in order to prevent and detect
criminal acts falling within the sphere of criminal investigation ac-
tivities."69 These sweeping powers were curtailed after the Hungar-
ian Constitutional Court deemed them unconstitutional. 70 Still, even
under the revised tax codes, tax authorities have extensive investiga-
tory powers that include, among others, the power to enter any room
that it is necessary to inspect, to examine documents, to request in-
formation from the taxpayer or his representative, and to investigate,
to the extent necessary, other taxpayers in a contractual relationship
with the taxpayer.71
In Russia the Federal Tax Police, a specialized police force
with the power to investigate criminal aspects of tax evasion, existed
until recently.72 The Federal Tax Police had the powers to conduct
inquiries into tax crimes and administrative law violations, to partici-
pate in audits at the request of tax authorities, and to carry out inves-
tigations where a crime was indicated. Although on paper these
powers are not substantially different from those of the Hungarian tax
authorities, in Russia there are few effective procedural controls on
66. See Berkowitch & Israel, supra note 17, at 360.
67. Gregory Frank, Police Enforcement of Tax Arrears Collection: Political Oppor-
tunism or the Last Resort for Transition States, 33 IDS BULL. 77, 77-83 (2002).
68. See Act XCIII of 1990 on Duties (Hung.) (IS1 Emerging Markets, Hatdlyos Magyar
Jogszabdlyok database), available at www.securities.com.
69. See Frank, supra note 67, at 79.
70. Id.
71. See Act XCII of 2003 on the Rules of Taxation § 98 (Hung.) (ISI Emerging Mar-
kets, HatAlyos Magyar Jogszabilyok database), available at www.securities.com.
72. Frank, supra note 67 at 80-81. See also Nalogovyi Kodeks [NK] [Tax Code] art.
36-37 (Russ.) [hereinafter Russian Tax Code]. The 1993 Law of the Russian Federation on
the Federal Tax Police Bodies (Vedomosti Syezda Narodnikh Deputatov Rossiyskoy Fed-
eratsii i Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiyskoy Federatsii) was amended in 1995 and subsequently
abolished in 2007 by Law 86-FZ of 30 June 2003. Federal Law on the Federal Tax Police
Bodies, June 24, 1993, No. 5238-I (Russ.) (IS1 Emerging Markets, Garant Database), avail-
able at www.securities.com.
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how law enforcement agents may exercise their powers. 73 The func-
tion and personnel of the Federal Tax Police have since been trans-
ferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which has not diminished
the sweeping investigatory powers associated with tax enforce-
ment.
74
To assess the impact of tax authorities on firm financing, it is
not only important to understand their investigatory powers, but also
their powers in the context of bankruptcy, including initiation pow-
ers, priority rules, as well as their ability to impose a lien on the debt-
ors' assets. Specifically with regards to bankruptcy, the tax authori-
ties in both countries have the power to initiate bankruptcy
proceedings. In both Hungary and Russia, this follows directly from
the bankruptcy laws. Russia's lists the tax authorities as one of the
state organs that can file for bankruptcy. 75 In Hungary, this follows
from the notion that any creditor has the right to bring bankruptcy
proceedings against an insolvent company, which includes the tax au-
thorities, even though they are not explicitly mentioned. 76 In both
countries the tax authorities have the power to unilaterally attach
property of a taxpayer in default and can thus initiate execution pro-
73. Evidence for this is provided by the Yukos case. The Russian tax authorities ad-
justed their claims whenever it suited their needs in order to ensure that the company would
end up in bankruptcy, which allowed the state to get control over these assets rather than al-
lowing the company to use future cash flow to pay back past debt. For a detailed account of
the Yukos case, see CURTIS MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM (forth-
coming 2008) (manuscript at ch. 8, on file with authors).
74. Presidential Decree, Mar. 11, 2003, No. 306 (Russ.) (IS1 Emerging Markets, Ga-
rant Database), available at www.securities.com.
75. The first Russian bankruptcy law of 1992 lists in addition to the debtor and credi-
tors only the Procuracy, an organ comparable to an attorney general with extensive criminal
and civil enforcement powers, but does not explicitly mention the tax authorities. Federal
Law on Insolvency, Nov. 19, 1992, No. 3929-1, art. 4 (Russ.) (repealed 1998) (ISI Emerging
Markets, Garant Database), available at www.securities.com. Article 11(3) of the 1998 In-
solvency Code declares that the rules on creditors should be also applied to tax authorities.
In addition, the same provision mentions the Russian Federation and its subjects as potential
initiators of bankruptcy. Federal Law on Insolvency, Jan. 8, 1998, art. 11(3) (Russ.)
(amended 2002) (ISI Emerging Markets, Garant Database), available at www.securities.com
[hereinafter 1998 Federal Law on Insolvency]. The power to represent the interests of the
Russian Federation was delegated to the relevant state authorities in separate decrees (in
1998 to the Federal Service of Russia for Financial Recovery and Bankruptcy (FSFO)).
Government Decree on the State Body for the Cases of Bankruptcy and Financial Sanitation,
Feb. 17, 1998, No. 202 (Russ.) (ISI Emerging Markets, Garant database), available at
www.securities.com [hereinafter Government Decree on Bankruptcy and Financial Sanita-
tion]. Art. 7 of the 2002 Insolvency Code allows authorized state agencies with monetary
claims against the debtor to file a bankruptcy case. 2002 Federal Law on Insolvency, supra
note 44, art. 7.
76. See Act IL of 1991 on Bankruptcy Proceedings, Liquidation Proceedings and Vol-
untary Dissolution § 22 (Hung.) (ISI Emerging Markets, Hat~lyos Magyar Jogszabilyok da-
tabase), available at www.securities.com (hereinafter Hungarian Bankruptcy Code).
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ceedings against the taxpayer's assets. 77 However, note that tax au-
thorities must take specific action to impose a lien and that a lien
does not attach automatically when a company defaults on its tax li-
abilities.78
A. The Case of Hungary
Hungary was one of the first of the former socialist countries
to enact a bankruptcy code when it did so in 1991. Apart from the
brief episode during which reorganization proceedings skyrocketed
(after the introduction of the automatic trigger), liquidation has been
the procedure of choice in Hungary. Since 1999, only 40 reorganiza-
tions have been filed on average in a given year. By contrast the av-
erage number of newly filed liquidation procedures per year is over
14,000.79 Of these liquidation proceedings, the state has been in-
volved in a significant number. The figure given in Table 1 above on
the share of bankruptcy proceedings initiated by the tax authorities
(36 percent) somewhat understates the actual involvement of the state
in shutting down firms. Table 1 lists only the number of bankruptcy
proceedings the tax authorities filed with the courts. When looking at
all liquidations, data suggest that the share of "voluntary liquida-
tions" that resulted from tax-authority-initiated enforcement actions
was substantially higher, reaching as high as 85 percent in 2001 (see
Table 2).
77. See Act XCII of 2003 on the Rules of Taxation § 150 (Hung.) (ISI Emerging Mar-
kets, Hatlyos Magyar Jogszabdlyok database), available at www.securities.com.
78. For Hungary, see id. For Russia, see Nalogovyi Kodeks [NK] [Tax Code] art. 73
(Russ.), which requires an agreement between the tax authorities and the tax subject for a
pledge to arise. Note, however, that the Russian tax authorities have the power to initiate
enforcement actions against a defaulting taxpayer by seizing bank accounts and property
outside a court procedure. See Nalogovyi Kodeks [NK] [Tax Code] art. 46 (Russ.).
79. Note that when comparing these data with filing data in the US, reorganization ap-
pears to be very low, as by far the majority of filings in the US are for Chapter 11 proceed-
ings. However, over 60 percent of these filings are thrown out and end up in liquidation.
See Morrison, supra note 45 at 3.
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Table 2: Hungarian Tax Authorities as Bell Toilers
Liquidation Tax Authority- Average amount of Average amount of out-
Announce- initiated cases as outstanding Credits standing Credits for
ments Share of Total (in million Forints) Tax Authority-initiated
Liquidations (in million
Forints)
1993 2593 22.9 10.1 11.1
1994 2484 43.9 13.1 10.3
1995 2799 63.8 8.3 13.2
1996 3078 39.3 9.2 23.5
1997 3171 36.9 14.1 26.2
1998 3288 57.4 16.7 15.3
1999 3495 59.7 22.4 25.9
2000 4468 78.7 16.1 15.1
2001 5762 85.2 11.3 11.9
2002 5845 83.6 9.9 10.9
2003 7660 72.9 11.7 9.2
Average 4058 58.61 13.9 15.7
Source: APEH reports (various years).
Notably, the number of tax-authority-initiated liquidations in-
creased substantially in the period between 1999 and 2003, even
though during this period Hungary's overall economic performance
had improved substantially. A plausible explanation-which is sub-
stantiated by the Tax Authorities' own annual reports-is that en-
forcement capacity increased. This capacity could have been used to
pursue more aggressive tax enforcement or to "clean up," i.e. to force
firms with years of tax-arrears to formally liquidate. There is sub-
stantial support for the latter in the data presented in Table 2. The tax
authorities' recovery rates were only 0.3 percent as of 2003, which is
substantially lower than the 1 percent recovered on average by other
creditors-suggesting that much of the enforcement was targeted at
small firms, many of which may had already ceased operating. In
fact, according to the tax authorities' own accounts, four fifths of all
liquidation proceedings are accelerated proceedings against firms
with no assets left to distribute.80 Second, the level of outstanding
claims against firms was higher for firms for which the tax authori-
ties initiated liquidation (Forints 15.7 Mln, or the equivalent of
US$2000 on average) than for all other firms (Forints 13.9 Mln. See
Table 2 above). In the absence of information about the debt/asset
ratio of these firms, this is not conclusive evidence that the tax au-
thorities tended to file against higher-leveraged firms, but it might be
indicative. Further support for this thesis comes from data that show
80. TAX & FIN. CONTROL ADMIN., BULLETIN: INFORMATION ON THE OPERATIONS OF
APEH IN THE YEAR 2003 32 (2004), http://www.apeh.hu/data/cms 1549/bulletin_2003.pdf.
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that the tax authorities have tended to pursue smaller rather than lar-
ger firms. Using legal form as a proxy for size (which can be justi-
fied on the grounds that joint stock companies tend to be larger than
limited liability companies ("LLCs"), partnerships, and coopera-
tives), we find that the Hungarian state has been most active in pursu-
ing relatively small firms. Tax authorities filed between 42 and 66
percent of all liquidations against limited partnerships, and close to
30 percent against LLCs. In the case of joint stock companies, tax
authorities have been much more timid, initiating only 4 to 7 percent
of all liquidation proceedings.
Table 3: Liquidation Proceedings by Type of Company
SOEs Cooperatives Limited Part- LLC Joint Stock Others
nership Company
1999 8(l) 255 (45) 1822(765) 6040(1591) 824(65) 171 (64)
2000 6(0) 311 (68) 2907(1477) 8257(2453) 923(59) 309(115)
2001 9 (1) 286 (85) 3944 (2267) 10008 (2937) 789 (47) 421 (210)
2002 9(4) 250(78) 4196(2647) 10384(2802) 788(43) 335(153)
2003 9(0) 209 (56) 4888 (3249) 10369 (2952) 879 (40) 364 (164)
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of liquidation proceedings that were ini-
tiated by state agents.
Source: APEH
To summarize, in Hungary tax authorities play an important
role in determining the ultimate fate of firms, palrticularly of small
and medium size firms. On average, tax authorities initiated 58 per-
cent of all liquidations announced between 1993 and 2003. This evi-
dence suggests that the state plays a crucial role in enforcing finan-
cial discipline, particularly against small firms (see Table 2 above).
This may be interpreted as evidence that the state is more likely to
tolerate a soft budget-constraint for larger firms. However, it may
also suggest that smaller firms, which by comparison lack access to
outside credit markets, are more highly leveraged and accordingly are
more likely than large firms to rely on tax arrears as sources of credit.
In any case, there is little evidence in these data that the Hungarian
tax authorities are using their increased enforcement capacity to pur-
sue larger targets in an attempt to re-nationalize assets, or for other
predatory purposes.
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B. The Case of Russia
Russia enacted its first bankruptcy law in 1992, which went
through major revisions in 199881 and then again in 2002.82 Under
all three variants of Russia's bankruptcy law, bankruptcy proceedings
could be initiated by the debtor, the creditor, or an organ of state
power. The 1998 law explicitly named the tax authorities as well as
"other authorized organs of state power" as potential bankruptcy ini-
tiators.83 A government decree, however, designated the Federal
Service of Russia for Financial Recovery and Bankruptcy (FSFO) as
the relevant body to represent the state in bankruptcy proceedings. 84
Its powers were further strengthened after the enactment of the 2002
Insolvency Law, when it acquired the status of the exclusive repre-
sentative of the state's interests in bankruptcy. Yet, in 2004 this
agency was abolished and its functions were merged with the reor-
ganized FTS, 85 which thereby became the exclusive body to repre-
sent the state in bankruptcy cases.
As noted above, the market response to the first enactment of
a bankruptcy law was rather muted, since only a few creditors took
action. Bankruptcy proceedings increased in the mid 1990s-in part
because changes in the bankruptcy law empowered creditors, and in
part because of tightened economic conditions that resulted after in-
flation was finally brought under control. Newly filed bankruptcy
cases further accelerated after 2000, with a new peak of over 100,000
cases filed in 2002 (see Table 4 below). By 2003, numbers were
back to about 14,000 new filings per year.
81. See 1998 Federal Law on Insolvency, supra note 75.
82. See 2002 Federal Law on Insolvency, supra note 44.
83. 1998 Federal Law on Insolvency, supra note 75 art 6.2.
84. See Government Decree on Bankruptcy and Financial Sanitation, supra note 75.
85. Government Decision on the Approval of the Regulations on the Federal Tax Ser-
vice, Sept. 30, 2004, No. 506 (Russ.) (ISI Emerging Markets, GARANT database), available
at www.securities.com.
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Table 4: Who Tolls the Bells for Firms in Russia?
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
BKR Initiated by Debtor 2,600 3,097 3,476 4,654 4,925 5,380
(20.7) (20.7) (14.8) (8.4) (4.6) (40.6)
Private Creditors only 3,170 3,435 4,726 5,289 7,122 2,920
(25.3) (22.9) (20.2) (9.5) (6.7) (22.0)
Tax authorities 4,037 5,92 10,865 37,767 87,63 4,963
(32.2) (39.6) (46.2) (68.0) (82.3) (37.4)
Federal BKR Authority 2,033 1,660 3,603 6,631 5,526
(16.2) (11.1) (15.3) (11.9) (5.2)
Other State 713 859 840 1,171 1,273
(5.7) (5.7) (3.6) (2.1) (1.2)
TOTAL 12553 14973 23510 55512 106480 13263
Note: Numbers in brackets indicate share of total
Source: Russian Supreme Arbitrazh Court from unpublished sources.
Closer inspection of the data reveals that the rise of the state
as bankruptcy initiator may be somewhat less dramatic than Table 4
suggests, even though it is still substantial. A sizeable share of all
bankruptcies filed were accelerated procedures against so called "ab-
sentee debtors," i.e. those that had not registered or filed their taxes
for a number of years. In fact, 81,251 of the bankruptcy cases filed
in 2002, when the total came to 106,647 (or 76 percent), were filed
against such absentee firms. This was the first year that the tax au-
thorities kept the company register, and suggests that they brought a
large number of bankruptcy cases simply to clean up their books and
the company register. It also indicates that the tax authority was tak-
ing its new role as company registrar and enforcer of mandatory reg-
istration requirements quite seriously. Still, even when discounting
these cases the share of bankruptcies brought by the state dwarfs
those brought by debtors or private creditors (see Table 5 below).
Table 5: BKR Filings in Russia without Absentee Debtors
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
BKR Initiated by Debtor 2,600 3,097 3,476 4,654 4,925 5,380
(18.5) (21.2) (20.4) (19.5) (17.3) (48.3)
Private Creditors only 3,170 3,435 4,726 5,289 7,122 2,920
(22.5) (23.5) (27.8) (22.1) (25.0) (26.2)
All State (Tax, Fed BKR, Other) 8,319 8,083 8,797 13,977 16,45 2,83
(59.0) (55.3) (51.8) (58.4) (57.7) (25.5)
TOTAL 14089 14615 16999 23920 28504 11131
Note: Share of total is given in parentheses.
Source: Russian Supreme Arbitrazh Court from unpublished sources.
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The data show that the state, and in particular the tax authori-
ties, were responsible for more than 50 percent of all bankruptcy fil-
ings in each year since 1998, except for 2003, when the share
dropped to only 25.5 percent. This decrease may have been a direct
response to the backlog triggered by aggressive filings in the preced-
ing year. According to statistics released by the Supreme Arbitrazh
Court of the Russian Federation, in 2003 courts of first instance de-
cided 56,440 bankruptcy cases-an increase of 27 percent over 2002.
The number of decided cases dropped to 20,116 cases in 2004 and
further to 18,812 in 2005, but reached an all-time high in 2006 with
60,848 cases.86 Although the identity of the bankruptcy initiator is
not available for these more recent years,87 there is little doubt that
the tax authorities are continuing to play a major role in bringing
firms into bankruptcy. In fact, the FTS has brought action with the
Russian constitutional court demanding that the statute of limitation
for past tax liabilities be relaxed. This would allow for the enforce-
ment of tax liabilities dating back to the early 1990s, when tax arrears
skyrocketed.
There is also some indication that the Russian tax authorities
are more aggressive in enforcement against larger firms. As noted
above, in Hungary the average debt of firms against which the tax au-
thorities foreclosed was about US$2000, and the recovery rate
against these firms was 0.03 percent (or US$60). Contrast this with
the Russian authorities' claims of collecting R 2000 bn (US$72 mln)
for the 2004 budget (much of which can be attributed to the enforce-
ment actions against Yukos). Using 2003 bankruptcy data, this
would suggest a recovery of, on average, US$2000 per firm.88
Moreover, Anatoly Serdyukov, the head of the Russian Tax Service
claimed in interviews that the tax authorities were involved in 47,000
bankruptcy cases and contemplating another 17,000, with a major
goal of these proceedings being to generate funds for the state
86. See Arbitration Courts in the Russian Federation, http://www.arbitr.ru: (arbi-
trazhnaya praktika; itogi raboti; various issues) (last visited Nov. 10 2007) (report of the ac-
tivities of the Arbitrazh Courts in the Russian Federation) for data 2002-2006; and Supreme
Arbitrazh Court, VESTNIK VYSSHEGO ARBITRAZHNOGO SUDA RossIISKOl FEDERATSrI (various
issues published once a year) for data 1992-2002.
87. Id. Data on the size of companies that have been targets of state initiated bankrupt-
cies are also not available. However, there are some indicators that the bulk of companies
that have been liquidated or auctioned off as the result of enforcement actions are not mar-
ginal players in the economy. Available data single out state owned enterprises, monopoly
companies, farmers, and individual entrepreneurs, among others, to assess the impact of
bankruptcy on the economy. These companies, taken together, account for only 9 to 14 per-
cent of all bankruptcy cases in a given year.
88. This calculation obviously overstates the likely recovery rate, as it uses only bank-
ruptcy cases, not other tax enforcement actions.
2008]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LA W
budget. 89 This suggests that even though the majority of enforce-
ment actions are being brought against absentee firms, the tax au-
thorities are not shy in taking on large companies, where-given the
larger asset base of firms-recovery rates tend to be higher. This is
further supported by anecdotal evidence, such as the Yukos case, and
recent enforcement actions initiated against companies with foreign
investments, such as VimpelCom, Norway's Telenor, and JT Interna-
tional, a unit of Japan Tobacco.
90
On the positive side, the state of Russia's tax arrears im-
proved considerably since Putin has come to power. While in 1998
the amount of past tax arrears equaled 91 percent of all tax obliga-
tions, by 2003 this number had declined to only 42 percent. Curi-
ously, during the same period, corporate tax arrears as a share of total
arrears increased from only 16.5 percent in 1998 to 42.9 percent in
2002, although it declined again to 32.3 percent in 2003. This evi-
dence suggests that while tax discipline has improved in general, tax
discipline in the corporate sector has not, and may even be declin-
ing-notwithstanding the tax authorities' aggressive enforcement
practices. This is in spite of tax reform, which introduced a flat cor-
porate tax of only 24 percent in 2001. In fact, the nominal value of
corporate tax arrears is still almost double of what it was in 1998
(Table 6 below).
Table 6: Tax Arrears in Russia
A1 amounts in billion Rubles 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Tax Obligations 259 371.6 461.7 475 521.8 520.4
Payments past due 235.6 335.7 354.2 237.7 209.6 220.8
Past due as share of Tax Obliga- 91.0 90.3 76.7 50.0 40.2 42.4
tions
Corporate Tax arrears 38.8 69.0 91. 88.3 88 71.4
Corporate tax arrears as share of 16.5 20.6 26.9 37.2 42.9 32.3
ll arrears
Source: Goskomstat (various years).
89. Russian Tax Service to Meet 2005 Collection Target, Says its Chief BBC
MONITORING FORMER SOVIET UNION, Apr. 26, 2005 (ISI Emerging Markets, BBC Monitor-
ing Database), available at www.securities.com.
90. Jason Bush, In Russia, The Taxman Cometh-Again and Again, BUSINESS WEEK
ONLINE, Mar. 7, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_10/b3923093_
mz054.htm.
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C. Summary
As the foregoing suggests, neither Russia nor Hungary seems
to make use of the pedagogical function of bankruptcy. Instead,
when tax authorities initiate bankruptcy proceedings they seem to
target firms that have few assets remaining, and whose operations the
tax authorities have already seized. In the few cases which buck this
trend, the Hungarian tax authorities seemed primarily to perform a
"creditor function," by using bankruptcy proceedings to impose fi-
nancial discipline and to satisfy outstanding claims by liquidating the
firm. As the data suggests, Hungary and Russia differ to the extent
that in Russia, but not in Hungary, tax authorities seem to engage in
predatory enforcement that is highly selective and appears politically
motivated.
V. DEBT FINANCE IN THE SHADOW OF THE TAx AUTHORITIES
This Section explores the likely impact the presence of the tax
authorities has on a firm's debt structure. It first considers how the
presence of tax authorities as creditors affects incentives for private
creditors of the same debtors. The argument put forward is that from
a theoretical perspective the outcome is ambiguous. Tax enforce-
ment may increase overall financial discipline. However, when firms
are already highly indebted to tax authorities, a shift from weak en-
forcement by tax authorities to strong enforcement may lower the in-
centive of private creditors to lend to firms, at least on an unsecured
basis. This Section then considers how tax enforcement may im-
prove the situation of private creditors. My chief insight here is that
private creditors may piggyback on enforcement activities of tax au-
thorities. Without spending substantial resources on monitoring
debtors, they can rely on the tax authorities disciplining creditors.
As Desai et al. suggested, in every taxed firm the tax authori-
ties are an important, albeit understudied, stakeholder. 91  While
agreeing with this basic proposition, this essay argues that the role of
the tax authorities is only incompletely described as equity-holder
and instead more akin to the holder of a convertible-equity claim, i.e.
an equity claim that automatically converts into a credit claim once
the firm defaults on its taxes. Contrary to Desai et al., this essay ar-
gues that the presence of the tax authorities thus has implications not
only for shareholders, but also for creditors of the firm. To place this
91. See Desai, supra note 18, at 592.
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analysis in the broader analysis of bankruptcy and debt finance, this
section first summarizes some of the recent theoretical literature on
bankruptcy and debt finance.
The bankruptcy literature has shown that a firm's debt struc-
ture is influenced in important ways, not only by the bankruptcy re-
gime,92 but also by the number of creditors a firm has.93 Economists
Dewatripont and Maskin distinguish between centralized and decen-
tralized credit markets, where the level of centralization is deter-
mined by the number of capital providers. 94 They suggest that the
likelihood that a project will be refinanced at a later stage in large
measures determines the ex ante decision to finance a particular pro-
ject. In the presence of multiple creditors, refinancing becomes more
difficult, mostly as a result of the coordination problems among
them. On the positive side, this coordination problem serves as a
commitment device at the ex ante stage not to refinance nonviable
projects in the future, thereby reducing the costs of debt finance.
Following this basic intuition, economists Bolton and Scharf-
stein95 model a firm's optimal debt structure as being contingent on
the number of the creditors this firm has. They suggest that the rela-
tive costs and benefits of having multiple creditors depend on the
likely cause of insolvency: liquidity or strategic default. 96 Liquidity
default means that a creditor does not have the cash to pay its debt
obligations as they become due.97 Strategic default means that the
firm's manager diverts firm assets to himself rather than using funds
to fulfill the firm's debt obligations.98 Facing the possibility of stra-
tegic default, creditors may be unwilling to lend. In order to optimize
their ability to obtain external debt finance, firms with low credit
quality should choose a single creditor and grant security interests
only to that creditor. This maximizes the creditor's liquidation value
and thus lowers the firm's cost of debt finance. Firms with high
credit quality, by contrast, should borrow from multiple creditors, as
this reduces the likelihood of strategic default. This follows from the
intuition that firms will have to pay more to fend off a liquidation
92. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Se-
cured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996).
93. See Erik Bergldf, G6rard Roland & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, An Incomplete-
Contracts Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy (Apr. 2000) (unpublished mimeograph),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=240048.
94. Mathias Dewatripont & Eric Maskin, Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and De-
centralized Economies, 62 REv. ECON. STuDs. 541, 541-43 (1995).
95. Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of
Creditors, 104 J. POL. EcoN. 1, 13-16 (1996).
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threat by multiple creditors because each creditor that forecloses
against the firm's assets must be bought off to increase the firm's
value. By implication, a firm with multiple creditors is less likely to
stage a strategic default.
Bergldf et al. 99 take the analysis a step further. Fully endoge-
nizing the need for a bankruptcy regime, they show that the probabil-
ity of strategic default may actually increase rather than decrease in
the presence of multiple creditors. The reason has to do with the fact
that firms with multiple creditors are often over-leveraged. 10 0 While
each individual claim may be fully enforceable, the sum of claims is
mutually inconsistent. This increases the incentive for strategic de-
fault. The function of bankruptcy law thus is to make creditor claims
consistent at the expost stage.
The analysis presented here builds on the important insight
that the probability of and the reason for default, in large part, deter-
mine the choice of a firm's debt structure. As Bolton and Scharfstein
have shown, the number of creditors and the allocation of security in-
terests among them may influence the probability of strategic de-
fault. 101
The contribution of this essay is to suggest that all firms sub-
ject to taxes have more than one creditor (the state, as a public credi-
tor, in addition to any private creditors), but that public and private
creditors may differ in important ways and at times have conflicting
interests. This may affect private creditors both negatively and posi-
tively. On the negative side, the presence of the tax authorities as
substantial creditors may crowd out private creditors. On the positive
side, for firms that have not accumulated substantial tax arrears, the
presence of tax authorities as 'convertible-equity holders' may in-
crease financial transparency and may help overcome coordination
and information problems that dispersed private creditors might face.
A. Contracting in the Shadow of the Tax Authorities
When a firm pays its taxes as they become due, the tax au-
thorities have an equity type claim against the firm. They receive a
substantial share of the firm's profits without exercising voting rights
or other procedural rights typically associated with equity claims.
Once the firm defaults on its taxes, however, this claim converts into
a debt claim, typically with additional enforcement powers attached
99. See Bergl6fet al. supra note 93.
100. Id. at 3.
101. See Bolton & Scharfstein, supra note 95, at 19-20.
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to it. Depending on the relevant laws in place, the tax authorities
may exercise even greater powers than an ordinary creditor.
In particular, the tax authorities may unilaterally create a lien
over the firm's assets; in some jurisdictions such a lien is automati-
cally created upon default. Alternatively, the tax authorities may ini-
tiate enforcement actions outside court, as is the case in Russia. 10 2
Moreover, even without securing their claims, tax authorities typi-
cally have priority over the claims of unsecured creditors. This is the
case both in Russia and in Hungary. Specifically, the priority rules of
the 1998 Russian bankruptcy code provides that claims of the state,
including the tax service, would be satisfied after secured creditors,
but prior to unsecured creditors. 10 3 Similarly, the 1993 Hungarian
Bankruptcy Law provides that unsecured tax claims are satisfied
prior to all other unsecured creditors. 10 4 Finally, the tax authorities'
objective function differs from that of private creditors. In particular,
they may be less willing to refinance a firm, even if it would enhance
the repayment likelihood of past arrears, because refinancing may
undermine tax compliance. In the interest of general tax compliance,
tax authorities are therefore more likely than private creditors to "toll
the bells for firms" that could still be viable. This may enhance the
commitment device at the ex ante stage.
Private creditors of the firm are safe to ignore any claims of
the tax authorities as long as the firm does not default on its tax.
Without a tax default, interest is paid from gross income, ensuring
that private creditors get paid before tax authorities realize their "eq-
uity" claim. Naturally, when a firm defaults on its tax, private credi-
tors do not benefit from the additional liquidity in the same way eq-
uity holders might benefit.
The private creditors' cost-benefit analysis changes, however,
once a firm has defaulted on its tax obligations. At this point, the tax
authorities can take enforcement actions, including liquidation ac-
tions in a bankruptcy proceeding. Senior secured creditors are not
harmed, as their claims will usually be satisfied prior to those of the
tax authorities. Unsecured creditors, however, may be squeezed out
by the tax authorities' enforcement actions. Therefore, if private
creditors expect the debtors to default on their taxes they should se-
cure their claims-which increases the cost of debt finance.
The key question for creditors in transition economies is
102. Russian Tax Code, supra note 72, art. 46(2) (tax authorities can forward a cash col-
lection-order to the bank of the taxpayer or tax agent, ordering the bank to withdraw funds
from the account).
103. 1998 Federal Law on Insolvency, supra note 75, art. 134.
104. Hungarian Bankruptcy Code, supra note 41, art. 57(1).
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whether to lend to firms that have already accumulated tax arrears.
Suppose the tax authorities were only another private creditor. If a
firm were already highly leveraged, a new creditor would be reluc-
tant to lend to that firm, and would do so only if she could secure her
claim and/or charge a substantial premium. The same reasoning ap-
plies, in principle, to a situation where the tax authorities are the sen-
ior creditors. However, the equation is influenced by the effective-
ness of tax enforcement and the objective function of the tax
authorities, in particular whether they are predators or simple claim
enforcers. Where tax enforcement is lax, creditors might ignore past
arrears. The risk they face is that enforcement practices might
change in the future and that past tax liabilities may trigger the insol-
vency of a firm that would otherwise be viable. The implications are
clear: in an economy with a history of tax arrears, creditors may be
reluctant to lend to firms, and if they do lend, only at additional costs
to the firm.
This reluctance of private creditors to lend is likely to in-
crease when a country moves from a weak enforcement state to a
high enforcement one, as happened in Russia under Putin. While the
probability of being targeted by the tax authorities may not be high
for every firm in the economy, the effects of enforcement actions
could be disastrous for the firms and their creditors, as suggested by
the Yukos case. 10 5 In this case, the state was able to recover its tax
losses (and perhaps even more). By contrast, private creditors of the
company, including foreign creditors, are still fighting to realize their
claims. 106
This suggests that the accumulation of tax arrears may have
impeded the development of private credit markets in the transition
economies. These countries confronted a dilemma. Creating a viable
tax regime was important to generate revenue and, according to
Desai et al., could under certain conditions improve financial disci-
pline. 107 However, in the early days tax authorities were too weak to
enforce compliance-and compliance was "naturally" low because
the firms did not have a history of paying taxes voluntarily. More-
over, because private credit markets had not yet developed, firms had
little choice but to shift to other sources of funds, including nonpay-
ment of tax obligations. Over time, tax authorities became more ef-
105. See generally MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 64.
106. Western Creditor Banks Called YUKOS' Subsidiary Tomskneft VNK to Repay the
Credit Granted to the Parent Structure, WPS BANKS & EXCHANGES, May 26, 2005 (1SI
Emerging Markets, Russia, WPS Banks & Exchanges Database), available at
www.securities.com.
107. Desai et al., supra note 18.
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fective and began to collect more systematically. This, however, cre-
ated additional uncertainties for private creditors, who had to reckon
with enforcement actions for past tax liabilities. Thus, the presence
of the tax authorities as a major creditor in many transition econo-
mies may help to explain why private credit markets have been slow
to develop. In fact, credit markets in transition economies tend to be
smaller than those of countries with similar levels of GDP, even
though firms in transition economies prefer credit markets to the less
well-developed equity markets. 10 8 Moreover, surveys of firms in the
region suggest that access to external finance remains difficult for
mostl 9-this being despite the fact that the banking sector has been
reformed substantially and that legal protections for creditor rights
have been put into place. "10
A possible solution to this dilemma is a tax amnesty for past
arrears. Although there is a moral hazard problem, establishing some
enforcement precedents should suffice to signal a general change in
policy. In fact, in Russia pressures have mounted to declare a general
tax amnesty for past tax arrears in the aftermath of the Yukos trial.
Such an amnesty would eliminate the uncertainty of tax enforcement
for both firms and creditors. After the tax authorities have demon-
strated their capability and willingness to enforce claims for tax ar-
rears, the danger of moral hazard is relatively low.
B. Tax Enforcement and Financial Discipline
In their paper on tax and theft, Desai, Dycke, and Zingales ar-
gue that state-imposed and state-enforced taxes can have the benefi-
cial effect of reducing corporate theft and enhancing shareholder
value.il' They build their argument in part on historical evidence in
the United States, where corporate taxes introduced in 1909 were ini-
tially levied at only 1 percent of profit. The explicit purpose of this
tax was not to create revenues for the state budget, but for the state to
better monitor firms and prevent theft.112 They also found support
for their argument by analyzing the effect of improved tax enforce-
108. See Pistor et al., supra note 16, at 331.
109. See Steven Fries, Tatiana Lysenko & Saso Polanec, The 2002 Business Environ-
ment and Enterprise Performance Survey: Results from a survey of 6,100 Firms 22-23
(EBRD Working Paper No. 84/2003), available at http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/wp008
4.pdf.
110. See Pistor et al., supra note 16, at 339.
111. See Desai et al., supra note 18.
112. Id. at 619 (quoting President Taft saying that "another merit of this tax [the federal
corporate excise tax] is the federal supervision which must be exercised in order to make the
law effective over the annual accounts and business transactions of all corporations").
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ment on share value in Russia after Putin came to power. 113
By contrast, this essay focuses on the cost of debt rather than
equity finance. As the economists Rajan and Zingales have shown,
in many countries, including in the United States, debt finance is
more important as a source of external finance than equity finance. 1
14
In transition economies, this pattern appears to be even more pro-
nounced. Only a few firms have issued equity securities l 5-
notwithstanding attempts to jump-start stock market development
through mass privatization. Instead, most firms rely on retained earn-
ings, and those that have recourse to external sources of finance tend
to rely on debt rather than equity. "16
This raises the question of whether corporate taxation and en-
forcement (as may be suggested by the analysis so far) are only det-
rimental for debt finance by private creditors, or whether they could
potentially have beneficial effects as well. Recall that creditors face
two major problems when confronting nonpayment. First, they face
an information problem, as they may have difficulties discerning
temporary illiquidity from insolvency. Second, creditors face a coor-
dination problem, in that each creditor benefits from enforcing her
claim unilaterally, but collectively they gain from a bankruptcy pro-
cedure. The tax authorities' extensive enforcement powers, including
the power to visit the premises of debtors and collect information on
the firm outside of any court procedures may help address the infor-
mation problem-provided, of course, that the tax authorities have
sufficient capacity. Moreover, even if the tax authorities preferred to
enforce unilaterally rather than collectively, the aggressive enforce-
ment of tax claims may induce the debtor to seek protection in bank-
ruptcy. As noted before, a large number of the supposedly "volun-
tary" bankruptcy filings of small and medium size firms in the US
seem to follow precisely this pattern. 117 Thus, the presence of the tax
authorities may improve financial discipline, thereby reducing the
cost of debt finance.
There is another way in which tax authorities may positively
influence private debt finance. As suggested by Dewatripoint and
113. Id.
114. Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zinagels, What do We Know about Capital Structure?
Some Evidence from International Data, 50 J. FIN. 1421, 1439-40 (1995).
115. See Anete Pajuste, Corporate Governance and Stock Market Performance in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe: A Study of Nine Countries 5 (2002), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3 10419.
116. See generally Erik Bergl6f & Patrick Bolton, The Great Divide and Beyond: Fi-
nancial Market Architecture in Transition, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 77 (2002).
117. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 24, at 2316.
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Maskin, 118 and Bolton and Scharfstein, 119 the cost of debt finance
will depend on the ability of creditors to protect themselves against
strategic default on the one hand, and against the likelihood that bad
projects will be funded at the refinancing stage, on the other. Turn-
ing to the latter problem first, the presence of the tax authorities is
likely to reduce the probability of refinancing and strengthen the ex
ante commitment device not to refinance bad projects. This follows
not only from the fact that, in the presence of the tax authorities, few
firms have only a single creditor. It is also related to the objective
function of the tax authorities. As noted already, tax authorities will
seek to maximize their returns with regards to a single firm while
seeking to enhance overall tax compliance. Liquidating some poten-
tially viable firms may therefore be a reasonable cost to incur from
their perspective. The major danger, of course, is that they will exit
firms that private creditors deem to be viable.
Regarding the strategic default problem, the same argument
can be made for debtors that Desai et al. have developed for minority
shareholders, namely that tax enforcement enhances transparency.1 20
The imposition of corporate taxes ensures at least a modicum of fi-
nancial accounting, which benefits not only tax authorities, but also
other stakeholders by making it more difficult to steal assets. The
major caveat to this argument is that tax authorities may in fact have
fewer resources to disentangle complex accounting structures and tax
avoidance schemes than private investors.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this essay, I sought to investigate when and how firms exit
the market in transition economies. I began by asserting that in most
economies, exit decisions are taken not by firms, but rather on behalf
of firms, and that important insights might be gained from under-
standing which stakeholders control the exit decision in different
economies. Data from transition economies suggest that the tax au-
thorities play an important, and at times dominant, role as creditors in
these countries. This prompted an analysis of the impact the pres-
ence of the tax authorities may have on the debt structure of firms. I
argued that, in the context of transition economies, improved tax en-
forcement can have detrimental effects for creditors, especially in
countries where firms had already accumulated substantial tax ar-
118. See Dewatripont & Maskin, supra note 94, at 555.
119. See Bolton & Scharfstein, supra note 95, at 20.
120. See Desai et al., supra note 18, at 595.
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rears. Stronger enforcement measures may challenge the viability of
these firms, even though future cash flow predictions might be posi-
tive. Moreover, where-as in Russia-there is reasonable fear that
enforcement action may be arbitrary, if not predatory, private credi-
tors may choose not to take any risks in the future. 12 1 However, the
argument I develop in this essay has implications beyond transition
economies, with their unique history of state control of the economy
and a transformation process marred by absent or ineffective legal in-
stitutions. Tax authorities are dormant creditors of virtually all firms,
in any economy. When and how they use their rights as creditors is
therefore critical for understanding the role of the state in the econ-
omy as well as in the operation of credit markets. As argued by
Desai et al., the presence of the tax authorities may have been critical
for promoting greater transparency of financial accounting, with
positive spill-over effects for private shareholders. Similarly, private
creditors may benefit from the state-as-creditor because the tax au-
thorities may strengthen the commitment to enforce against delin-
quent debtors.
This is not an argument in favor of high taxes or a strong
presence of the state in private firms. It merely suggests that the state
does play a much larger role as a stakeholder in firms than is typi-
cally assumed in corporate governance and bankruptcy literature.122
Given the presence of this stakeholder, it seems important to under-
stand how exactly it affects the governance and financing of such
firms.
121. Note that private creditors of Yukos have still not found relief for their claims,
which were ignored when Yukos was liquidated and its assets transferred back to state own-
ership. They sued outside Russia, however, and in 2007 a Dutch court deemed the bank-
ruptcy of Yukos void under Dutch law. See Dutch Court Voids Yukos Bankruptcy in Nether-
lands, REUTERS, Oct. 31, 2007, available at http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2007/10/
dutchcourtvoidsyukos bankru.htm (last visited April 10, 2008).
122. See e.g., Desai et al., supra note 18.
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